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LEtranger--help please with my studies

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  • LEtranger--help please with my studies

    LEtranger and friends:

    I am afraid my German is not what it should be. I am looking into the Volksbuch, particularly tales it contains concerning Faust. All things Faust can be found here:

    http://www.ucalgary.ca/~esleben/faus...ronologie.html

    Now, my query has to do especailly with the Volksbuch published in 1587 (English translation 1592, and what is clearly an antecedent to Marlowe's play.) Question: who was the author of the Volksbuch, and, in regards to Faust, does he perhaps have in mind not only the legends of some German magician(s) named Faust, but could he also be reacting to an Italian "Socian" theologian, Faustus Socinus, who was living and writing at that time (1539-1604)?

    Socinus, as every schoolboy knows, denied the divinity of Christ and the claim that immortality was inherent to Man's nature. He was the direct father of the Unitarians, and exerted an influence on the Dutch Arminians (and thus on English Christian Independents/Early-Moderns such as Milton, Locke, Jonathan Mayhew, and Jefferson.)

    Might the inclusion of the Faust story in the Volksbuch reflect Reformation politics? Is the Volksbuch author (perhaps in an effort to defend the Augustinian orthodoxy) alluding to Socinus?

    Um, sort of a story challenge, too, if you like, people....

  • #2
    And when Europe fell under the spell of the teachings of Faustus Socinus, the Zombies attacked!



    EEK!

    Comment


    • #3
      French intellectuals and statesmen looked into the situation....

      Comment


      • #4
        An important Dialect Without Closure was published to counter the heterodox teachings of Faustus Socinus:

        Reason became instrumental and technocratic, and humans forgot their imbrication, and an overarching philosophy of history based on the notion of the domination of nature, arguing that the Western world, impelled by the instinct of self-preservation, once overcame the terrors of nature through magic, myth, and finally the Enlightenment but that this cognitive and technological Enlightenment then reverted to myth and barbarism (the historical reference point is German fascism, and the birth of a dialectic without closure). Reason became instrumental and technocratic, and humans forgot their imbrication with the natural environment, and spoke a dialectic without closure. The theme of the domination of nature, with nature conceived (as in Karl Marx) as both outer and "inner" nature, is thus combined with the Weberian motif of rationalization and "disenchantment" of the world to produce a "concept of Enlightenment" (the title of the first, programmatic chapter) that betrays its own original liberating impulse, and produces a dialectic without closure. The equivocation in this account, never explicit in the book, is its reliance on an emphatic or even utopian concept of "good" reason as the basis for its criticism of the insufficient, truncated reason of the Enlightenment. Dialectic without closure addresses this truncation of plenitudinous reason on the cognitive level of (philosophical) concepts: insisting on the nonidentity of concept and object, of universal and particular, and evoking the danger that the former will subsume the latter, the book posits a number of philosophical polarities in order to work through in immanent criticism the inadequacies of conceptual opposites, and this by means of a dialectic that never results in synthesis or closure, but that insists on the continuing tension between concepts, and results, finally, in a dialectic without closure. The central term "nonidentity" (similar to Jacques Derrida's differance), by evoking the fundamental disjunction between the concept and its purported referent, goads Adorno into philosophizing in "constellations" or "models," where the concepts and oppositions of traditional metaphysics (subject and object, the universal and the particular) are considered in the chiasmatic perspective of both their truth and their falsehood and their purported referent. Dialectic without closure or "negative dialectics," based on the materialist assumption of the "priority of the object," thus becomes a never-ending effort to transcend by means of concepts the limitations of those concepts, circling about the ideal object: the individual, the specific, the nonidentical, and yielding finally a dialectic without closure.

        Comment


        • #5

          THEODORE ADORNO

          Frankfort School founder Theodor Adorno proclaimed that no true dialect without closure was possible so long as the civilization that Faustus Socinus created was permitted to thrive within the Placelife sectors of the European Lifeplace....

          Comment


          • #6

            Max Horkheimer

            German philosopher and social scientist Max Horkheimer--director of the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research 1930-1958; close associate of Theodor Adorno, who mixed Marxism with influences as diverse as Schopenhauer, Dilthey, Nietzsche and Freud, and so on--argued that the working class could never be the vehicle for social change simply as a result of its position within the production process, and concluded that only the development of theory itself could be the scene of a dialect without closure. Therfore, he too judged with Adoro against Faustus Socinus, and moreover pointed to the one country that was most culpable in the promotion of Socinian teachings: the Holland of Arminius!

            "But destroy Holland?" asked Adorno, shocked at the implications of Horkheimer's indictment against the Dutch nation.

            Comment


            • #7
              Originally posted by Adorno

              "But destroy Holland?" asked Adorno, shocked at the implications of Horkheimer's indictment against the Dutch nation.


              "JA! JA! KAPUT!"

              Comment


              • #8


                "Nine!"

                Comment


                • #9


                  "JA! JA!"

                  Comment


                  • #10


                    "Ho-kay, Max! But let me apply mine genius to zee problem!"

                    Comment


                    • #11


                      "Vunderbar! Zat iz all I can ask, mine freund."

                      Comment


                      • #12
                        Hmmmmmm. Ahhh! Hmmmmmm . . . Reason became instrumental and technocratic, and humans forgot their imbrication, and an overarching philosophy of history based on the notion of the domination of nature, arguing that the Western world, impelled by the instinct of self-preservation, once overcame the terrors of nature through magic, myth, and finally the Enlightenment but that this cognitive and technological Enlightenment then reverted to myth and barbarism (the historical reference point is German fascism, and the birth of a dialectic without closure). Reason became instrumental and technocratic, and humans forgot their imbrication with the natural environment, and spoke a dialectic without closure. The theme of the domination of nature, with nature conceived (as in Karl Marx) as both outer and "inner" nature, is thus combined with the Weberian motif of rationalization and "disenchantment" of the world to produce a "concept of Enlightenment" (the title of the first, programmatic chapter) that betrays its own original liberating impulse, and produces a dialectic without closure. The equivocation in this account, never explicit in the book, is its reliance on an emphatic or even utopian concept of "good" reason as the basis for its criticism of the insufficient, truncated reason of the Enlightenment. Dialectic without closure addresses this truncation of plenitudinous reason on the cognitive level of (philosophical) concepts: insisting on the nonidentity of concept and object, of universal and particular, and evoking the danger that the former will subsume the latter, the book posits a number of philosophical polarities in order to work through in immanent criticism the inadequacies of conceptual opposites, and this by means of a dialectic that never results in synthesis or closure, but that insists on the continuing tension between concepts, and results, finally, in a dialectic without closure. The central term "nonidentity" (similar to Jacques Derrida's differance), by evoking the fundamental disjunction between the concept and its purported referent, goads Adorno into philosophizing in "constellations" or "models," where the concepts and oppositions of traditional metaphysics (subject and object, the universal and the particular) are considered in the chiasmatic perspective of both their truth and their falsehood and their purported referent. Dialectic without closure or "negative dialectics," based on the materialist assumption of the "priority of the object," thus becomes a never-ending effort to transcend by means of concepts the limitations of those concepts, circling about the ideal object: the individual, the specific, the nonidentical, and yielding finally a dialectic without closure. Hmmmmmmmm hmmmmmmm . . . Hmmmmmm. Ahhh! Hmmmmmm . . . Reason became instrumental and technocratic, and humans forgot their imbrication, and an overarching philosophy of history based on the notion of the domination of nature, arguing that the Western world, impelled by the instinct of self-preservation, once overcame the terrors of nature through magic, myth, and finally the Enlightenment but that this cognitive and technological Enlightenment then reverted to myth and barbarism (the historical reference point is German fascism, and the birth of a dialectic without closure). Reason became instrumental and technocratic, and humans forgot their imbrication with the natural environment, and spoke a dialectic without closure. The theme of the domination of nature, with nature conceived (as in Karl Marx) as both outer and "inner" nature, is thus combined with the Weberian motif of rationalization and "disenchantment" of the world to produce a "concept of Enlightenment" (the title of the first, programmatic chapter) that betrays its own original liberating impulse, and produces a dialectic without closure. The equivocation in this account, never explicit in the book, is its reliance on an emphatic or even utopian concept of "good" reason as the basis for its criticism of the insufficient, truncated reason of the Enlightenment. Dialectic without closure addresses this truncation of plenitudinous reason on the cognitive level of (philosophical) concepts: insisting on the nonidentity of concept and object, of universal and particular, and evoking the danger that the former will subsume the latter, the book posits a number of philosophical polarities in order to work through in immanent criticism the inadequacies of conceptual opposites, and this by means of a dialectic that never results in synthesis or closure, but that insists on the continuing tension between concepts, and results, finally, in a dialectic without closure. The central term "nonidentity" (similar to Jacques Derrida's differance), by evoking the fundamental disjunction between the concept and its purported referent, goads Adorno into philosophizing in "constellations" or "models," where the concepts and oppositions of traditional metaphysics (subject and object, the universal and the particular) are considered in the chiasmatic perspective of both their truth and their falsehood and their purported referent. Dialectic without closure or "negative dialectics," based on the materialist assumption of the "priority of the object," thus becomes a never-ending effort to transcend by means of concepts the limitations of those concepts, circling about the ideal object: the individual, the specific, the nonidentical, and yielding finally a dialectic without closure. Hmmmmmmmm Hmmmm . . .

                        Hmmm....

                        Hmmmmmm. Ahhh! Hmmmmmm . . . Reason became instrumental and technocratic, and humans forgot their imbrication, and an overarching philosophy of history based on the notion of the domination of nature, arguing that the Western world, impelled by the instinct of self-preservation, once overcame the terrors of nature through magic, myth, and finally the Enlightenment but that this cognitive and technological Enlightenment then reverted to myth and barbarism (the historical reference point is German fascism, and the birth of a dialectic without closure). Reason became instrumental and technocratic, and humans forgot their imbrication with the natural environment, and spoke a dialectic without closure. The theme of the domination of nature, with nature conceived (as in Karl Marx) as both outer and "inner" nature, is thus combined with the Weberian motif of rationalization and "disenchantment" of the world to produce a "concept of Enlightenment" (the title of the first, programmatic chapter) that betrays its own original liberating impulse, and produces a dialectic without closure. The equivocation in this account, never explicit in the book, is its reliance on an emphatic or even utopian concept of "good" reason as the basis for its criticism of the insufficient, truncated reason of the Enlightenment. Dialectic without closure addresses this truncation of plenitudinous reason on the cognitive level of (philosophical) concepts: insisting on the nonidentity of concept and object, of universal and particular, and evoking the danger that the former will subsume the latter, the book posits a number of philosophical polarities in order to work through in immanent criticism the inadequacies of conceptual opposites, and this by means of a dialectic that never results in synthesis or closure, but that insists on the continuing tension between concepts, and results, finally, in a dialectic without closure. The central term "nonidentity" (similar to Jacques Derrida's differance), by evoking the fundamental disjunction between the concept and its purported referent, goads Adorno into philosophizing in "constellations" or "models," where the concepts and oppositions of traditional metaphysics (subject and object, the universal and the particular) are considered in the chiasmatic perspective of both their truth and their falsehood and their purported referent. Dialectic without closure or "negative dialectics," based on the materialist assumption of the "priority of the object," thus becomes a never-ending effort to transcend by means of concepts the limitations of those concepts, circling about the ideal object: the individual, the specific, the nonidentical, and yielding finally a dialectic without closure. Hmmmmmmmm . . . hmmmmmmm . . . Hmmmmmm. Ahhh! Hmmmmmm . . . Reason became instrumental and technocratic, and humans forgot their imbrication, and an overarching philosophy of history based on the notion of the domination of nature, arguing that the Western world, impelled by the instinct of self-preservation, once overcame the terrors of nature through magic, myth, and finally the Enlightenment but that this cognitive and technological Enlightenment then reverted to myth and barbarism (the historical reference point is German fascism, and the birth of a dialectic without closure). Reason became instrumental and technocratic, and humans forgot their imbrication with the natural environment, and spoke a dialectic without closure. The theme of the domination of nature, with nature conceived (as in Karl Marx) as both outer and "inner" nature, is thus combined with the Weberian motif of rationalization and "disenchantment" of the world to produce a "concept of Enlightenment" (the title of the first, programmatic chapter) that betrays its own original liberating impulse, and produces a dialectic without closure. The equivocation in this account, never explicit in the book, is its reliance on an emphatic or even utopian concept of "good" reason as the basis for its criticism of the insufficient, truncated reason of the Enlightenment. Dialectic without closure addresses this truncation of plenitudinous reason on the cognitive level of (philosophical) concepts: insisting on the nonidentity of concept and object, of universal and particular, and evoking the danger that the former will subsume the latter, the book posits a number of philosophical polarities in order to work through in immanent criticism the inadequacies of conceptual opposites, and this by means of a dialectic that never results in synthesis or closure, but that insists on the continuing tension between concepts, and results, finally, in a dialectic without closure. The central term "nonidentity" (similar to Jacques Derrida's differance), by evoking the fundamental disjunction between the concept and its purported referent, goads Adorno into philosophizing in "constellations" or "models," where the concepts and oppositions of traditional metaphysics (subject and object, the universal and the particular) are considered in the chiasmatic perspective of both their truth and their falsehood and their purported referent. Dialectic without closure or "negative dialectics," based on the materialist assumption of the "priority of the object," thus becomes a never-ending effort to transcend by means of concepts the limitations of those concepts, circling about the ideal object: the individual, the specific, the nonidentical, and yielding finally a dialectic without closure. Hmmmmmmmm Hmmmm . . . AH HA!

                        Comment


                        • #13


                          "You zay zomting?"

                          Comment


                          • #14


                            "Ja! Not zee Dutch, my friend, but radzer zee zymbol oft zere enlightenment civilization--the culmination of zee heterodox teachings uft Faustus Socinus, und zee legacy uft zere Dutch formulator, Arminius, zee creator uft zee modern vorld undt all zee evils in it!"

                            Comment


                            • #15


                              "Vat! Vat! Vat! Vat an zymbolize all zees tings what you are calling the enlightenment-Dutch-civilization-stuff, eh?"

                              Comment

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